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ABSTRAcT
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) do not gain sufficient economic returns despite their significant economic 
contributions. A possible cause of poor SME performance is weak corporate governance. However, the corporate 
governance of SMEs is rarely investigated. Ownership structure provides SMEs with a monitoring mechanism that enhances 
performance. This study examines the relationships between board characteristics (including size, composition boards, 
cEO duality, expertise, and ethnicity) and SME performance in Malaysia. This study also explores how such relationships 
can be moderated by monitoring ownership structure. Survey results on SMEs in Klang Valley and Selangor areas show 
that non-executive boards and cEO duality are significantly and positively related to firm performance. In comparison, 
management ownership is significantly and negatively related to performance. Board size, expertise, ethnicity, and 
family ownership are not significantly related to SME performance. Findings indicate that good corporate governance 
improves decision making and firm performance. Furthermore, agency theory can explain conflict of interest in SMEs 
and the importance of corporate governance in enhancing their performance.
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ABSTRAK
Meskipun perusahaan kecil dan sederhana (PKS) menyumbang secara signifikan kepada ekonomi negara, sektor ini tidak 
memperoleh pulangan ekonomi yang lumayan. Prestasi yang lemah ini berlaku mungkin akibat tadbir urus korporat 
yang tidak kukuh. Namun, bilangan kajian tadbir urus korporat PKS sangat sedikit. Kajian lepas menunjukkan struktur 
pemilikan merupakan mekanisma pemantauan yang meningkatkan prestasi PKS. Kajian ini meneliti hubungan ciri lembaga 
pengarah (termasuk saiz, komposisi ahli, pengarah urusan dualiti, kepakaran dan jenis etnik) dengan prestasi PKS di 
Malaysia. Kajian ini turut meneroka peranan struktur pemilikan menguatkan hubungan tersebut. Hasil tinjauan PKS di 
sekitar Lembah Klang dan Selangor menunjukkan ahli lembaga pengarah bukan eksekutif dan pengarah urusan dualiti 
masing-masing mempengaruhi prestasi syarikat secara positif dan signifikan. Pemilikan pengurusan pula mempengaruhi 
prestasi syarikat secara negatif dan signifikan. Hubungan yang signifikan tidak wujud antara saiz lembaga pengarah, 
kepakaran, jenis etnik dan pemilikan keluarga dengan prestasi PKS. Secara keseluruhan, hasil kajian menunjukkan 
bahawa tadbir urus korporat yang baik meningkatkan proses pembuatan keputusan dan prestasi syarikat. Kajian ini 
membuktikan bahawa teori agensi adalah relevan untuk menerangkan konflik kepentingan di kalangan PKS dan tadbir 
urus adalah perlu untuk meningkatkan prestasi. 
Kata kunci: PKS; tadbir urus korporat; pengarah urusan duality; jenis etnik; pemilikan pengurusan; pemilikan 
keluarga
INTRODUCTION
The poor governance of SMEs may create opportunities 
for expropriation of assets, which may result in 
ineffective management (Walker & Fox 2002). Ineffective 
management may lead to various consequences, such as 
low performance, decreased firm value, and increased 
financing risk (Afrifa & Tauringana 2015). This 
phenomenon is evident from the low average productivity 
of SMEs in Malaysia (The SME Annual Report 2015/2016). 
The SME Annual Report (2015/2016) indicates that SMEs 
contribute only 36.3% to gross domestic product (GDP); 
this level is lower than that in other countries, such as 
Japan, South Korea, and Germany, where the contribution 
of SMEs to the GDP exceeds 50% (Thomas 2014). 
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The success or failure of a company, regardless of 
whether it is a listed company or a SME, is determined 
by the corporate governance practices (Chung 2011). 
Empirical evidence shows that good corporate governance 
results in a positive effect on performance among listed 
companies (Bhagat & Bolton 2008; Ibrahim 2011; OECD 
2005). Good governance improves the management 
effectiveness and strengthens the firm performance 
thereby generating economic resources in terms of job 
opportunities, dividends, and taxes; these factors benefit 
society (Tornyeva & Wereko 2012). A poor corporate 
governance on the other hand, may weaken the firm 
performance which may lead to the macro-economic 
crises and consequently affects the economic growth of 
the country negatively. The Asian economic crisis is an 
example of the drop in share prices, which may have been 
triggered by the lack of good governance (Mitton 2002).
The poor performance of SMEs may possibly be 
associated to the low level of corporate governance 
practices resulting from the non-mandatory requirements 
on good governance practices among SMEs (Heuvel 2006). 
Heuvel (2006) argues that corporate governance may be 
able to improve the performance of SMEs in a similar 
manner to the positive outcome on the performance of 
listed companies. It is expected that the SME performance 
may be improved with the implementation of good 
corporate governance practices. As Heuvel (2006) clearly 
argues, corporate governance has an important role in the 
enhancement of the performance of SMEs which would 
contribute significantly tothe increase in the Malaysian 
economy. However, there is currently a lack of evidence 
that support the positive effects of governance monitoring 
on SME performance (Heuvel 2006). The positive 
significant effect of good governance on firm performance 
was concluded mainly from studies on publicly listed 
companies (Bhagat & Bolton 2008; Gillan 2006; Jackling 
& Johl 2009). 
This study attempts to close the gap by investigating 
the relationship between corporate governance and SME 
performance. The results are expected to provide basis 
for the development of policies that require corporate 
governance practices in SMEs to enhance and sustain their 
performance, significance, and relevance to the Malaysian 
economy (Tornyeva & Wereko 2012). In this study, the 
discussions are benchmarked against the governance 
practices of listed companies.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT
SMEs are companies that are not listed in any stock 
exchange because of their limited number of shareholdings 
or restrictions on the transfer of resources (OECD 2005). 
SMEs comprise sole proprietorships, family businesses, 
partnerships, and companies. The management decisions 
and business direction of SMEs are made by majority equity 
holders. In Malaysia, the Board of National Development of 
Small and Medium Enterprises (i.e., Majlis Pembangunan 
Perniagaan Kecil dan Sederhana Kebangsaan or MPPK) 
has provided a standardized definition of SMEs that took 
effect on 1 January 2014. According to the MPPK guideline, 
SMEs in Malaysia are can be categorized into micro, small, 
or medium enterprise depending on the amount of sales or 
number of full-time employees. Most SMEs in Malaysia 
belong to the agro-base, manufacturing, agriculture, or 
service industries. 
SMEs play an important role in a country’s economic 
development. SMEs in Malaysia account for 97.3% of the 
total number of business organizations (The Economic 
Census Report 2011). SMEs dominate the economy through 
their large contributions to the GDP and job opportunities 
(Akugri, Bagah & Wulifan 2015; Omar, Arokiasamy & 
Ismail 2009; UNDP 2007; Voordeckers 2007). In addition, 
SMEs provide job opportunities to more than 50% of the 
total workforce. Thus, SMEs comprise a large economic 
sector that significantly contributes to the increase in 
national income (International Finance Corporation 2006). 
Thus, the performances of both listed companies and SMEs 
are vital to a country’s economic development.
The average productivity of SMEs in Malaysia is 
only one-third of the productivity of large organizations. 
This level is lower than that that in other countries. For 
example, the productivity of SMEs in Singapore and the 
United States is four and seven times higher than that 
in Malaysia (Master Plan of SMEs 2012-2020). SME 
performance reflects the economic position and prosperity 
of a country (Tornyeva & Wereko 2012). The ability of 
SMEs to contribute to the economy becomes questionable 
when they perform poorly. SMEs must improve their 
performance to boost their economic contribution.
CHARACTERISTICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (Malaysian 
Institute of Corporate Governance, 2012) and the Corporate 
Governance Guide of Bursa Malaysia Berhad (Bursa 
Malaysia Bhd. 2013) have outlined specific characteristics 
that are considered the best corporate governance practices 
for firms. These characteristics cover the aspects of 
management, board of directors, audit committees, and 
other relevant stakeholders, such as auditors which are 
important in enhancing firm performance.
The Code did not specify the appropriate number 
of directors. Gregory (2007) suggests the ideal number 
of board members at between 5 and 10. However, the 
decision on the optimal size of the board is unique to 
each company and is driven by the notion that the board 
should neither be excessively large nor small which 
would discourage efficient and effective decision-making 
(Gregory 2007). A considerably small board size reduces 
the ability of the board for management control, whereas 
a significantly large board size hampers communication 
and work alignment (Eisenberg, Sundgren & Wells 
1998). An optimal board size positively influences firm 
performance by promoting the participation of board 
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members in performing their functions (Yermack 1996). 
Beyond optimal size, increased board size improves a 
firm’s financial burden to cover the compensation costs 
and incentives of board members (Haniffa & Hudaib 
2006). In Malaysia, a small board size enhances firm 
performance because of the low costs of compensation 
and incentives (Ibrahim 2011). 
However, a number of scholars argued that board size 
is positively related to firm performance (Daily & Dalton 
1993; Jackling & Johl 2009; Pearce & Zahra 1992). A large 
board size provides improved intellectual knowledge, 
which improves the quality of strategic decisions that 
positively drive firm performance (Daily & Dalton 1993). 
A large board size also reduces the controlling power of 
the CEO over the management (Forbes & Milliken 1999). 
When the board is large, the CEO becomes accountable to 
additional queries. However, once the board size becomes 
excessively large, its effect on firm performance becomes 
decreases because of additional costs (Bennedsen, 
Kongsted & Nielsen 2008). 
The effect of board size on SMEs may differ from 
that in listed companies (Eisenberg et al. 1998). Increased 
board size of SMEs is expected to improve firm performance 
(Abor & Adjasi 2007; Hamad & Karoui 2011; Swamy 
2011). The board of directors of SMEs play a minor role 
in monitoring, supervising, and giving incentives because 
of the owner–manager relationship (Bennedsen et al. 
2008). The agency problem that arises from the conflict of 
interest between managers and owners is minimized when 
managers are owners. Owners are motivated to manage 
the firm to their best interest. Thus, boards of directors of 
SMEs have an insignificant monitoring role. This finding 
suggests that SMEs requires a smaller number of board 
members than listed companies. This study attempts to 
determine the appropriate board size that can improve 
SME performance. Thus, the following hypothesis is 
developed:
H1a The size of board of directors has a positive and 
significant relationship with SME performance. 
Appointing an external director or a non-executive 
director is an issue in SMEs. The number of external 
directors in the board of SMEs is considerably small 
(Brunninge, Nordqvist & Wiklund 2007; Coulson-Thomas 
2007). The majority of SMEs do not formally appoint 
board members (Uhlaner, Wright & Huse 2007). Most 
owner–managers of SMEs do not believe in the necessity 
of appointing a board of directors and they do not 
recognize their contributions (Neville 2011). Thus, SMEs 
do not benefit from the contributions of external directors 
(Bettinelli 2011).
Agency theory suggests that a high ratio of external 
directors can help in effectively monitoring the conflict 
of interest between management and shareholders (Fama 
& Jensen 1983). Independent external directors reduce 
the opportunities of internal directors to deny shareholder 
interest (Fama & Jensen 1983; Gabrielsson & Huse 2005). 
A high ratio of external directors positively affects firm 
performance (Fama & Jensen 1983). Most SMEs have 
limited internal resources, such as managerial skills and 
expertise (Daily & Dalton 1992). Thus, experienced 
and independent external directors must be appointed 
to complement shortage in knowledge, experience, and 
skills in managing a company (Gabrielsson & Huse 2005). 
External directors can share their financial knowledge, 
which aids the management in obtaining financing and 
enhancing firm performance (Abor & Adjasi 2007). 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed:
H1b External directors have a positive and significant 
relationship with SME performance. 
A number of companies practice CEO duality, wherein 
the CEO also acts as the chairman of the board of directors. 
CEO duality may negatively affect firm performance (Fama 
& Jensen 1983). When separate individuals manage and 
control policies and board decisions, the effectiveness of 
monitoring of top management improves (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). The board can effectively perform its monitoring 
role when the positions between the CEO and the chairman 
are separated. Separating the two positions also reduces 
the opportunities for the CEO and other internal board 
members to take advantage of situations that do not 
increase firm value (Braun & Sharma 2011). However, 
other scholars argue that CEO duality enhances the 
performance of companies, particularly SMEs (Donaldson 
& Davis 1991). CEO duality is a common practice in 
SMEs, especially when the board size is small and external 
directors are few (Corbetta & Montemerlo 1999; Huse 
2000; Lappalainen & Niskanen 2012). Gill, Mand and 
Mathur (2012) and Westhead (1997) argued that CEO 
duality in SMEs promotes the monitoring role that ensures 
that the welfare of stakeholders is prioritized. CEO duality 
is ideal for making good decisions and forming a well-
designed, strong, and transparent leadership structure. 
SMEs with CEO duality gain high profits because of the 
aligned leadership structure and the low cost of conflict 
between the CEO and the board of directors (Gill, Mand 
& Mathur 2012). An individual who serves as CEO and 
chairman can make good decisions (Donaldson & Davis 
1991; Gill, Mand & Mathur 2012). The positive effect 
of CEO duality depends on the size of the firm (Huse 
2000). CEO duality offers additional benefits in SMEs, 
where clear and focused decisions are important for the 
management. CEO duality is expected to improve SME 
performance (Abor & Biekpe 2007; Huse 2000). SMEs 
with CEO duality perform better than those without CEO 
duality (Gabrielsson 2007). The positive effect of CEO 
duality on firm transparency is particularly significant in 
advanced SMEs. By contrast, large firms may perform well 
when two separate individuals perform the roles of CEO 
and chairman (Fama & Jensen 1983; Gill 2011). Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is developed:
H1c CEO duality has a positive and significant relationship 
with SME performance. 
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The financial literacy of board of directors with regard 
to the nature of business, development level, and firm 
operation is important in enhancing firm performance 
(Coulson-Thomas 2007). The financial literacy required for 
managing a listed company may differ from that of a newly 
formed SME. An effective monitoring of firm operation 
can be guaranteed by a board of directors equipped with 
knowledge and skills in finance and accounting (Fauziah 
& Yusoff 2012). The literacy of a board encompasses 
different aspects, including finance, corporate planning, 
business forecast, law, risk management, human resources, 
and international business; these aspects are important for 
firm performance.
In Malaysia, Zulridah and Iskandar (2012) found 
that financially literate boards of directors were capable 
of securing financially distressed companies. Companies 
managed by financially literate board of directors sustained 
their businesses. However, only a few SME directors in 
Malaysia are financially literate (Radam, Abu & Abdullah 
2008). Thus, a growing demand for directors with financial 
literacy exists in accounting and finance. 
The literacy of board of directors can increase their 
efficiency to perform the directorship role of improving 
firm performance (Abor & Biekpe 2007; Babic, 
Nikolic & Eric 2011; Lybaert 1998). Directors who are 
knowledgeable and skilled in accounting and finance can 
effectively perform various duties, including internal 
control and accounting procedure review, reporting, 
problems solving, and decision making (Jeanjean & 
Stolowy 2009).Board members with accounting and 
finance backgrounds can improve the credibility and image 
of the company (Haniffa & Cooke 2006).
Financially literate board of directors can properly 
monitor firm performance (Gabrielson & Winlund 
2000; Lybaert 1998). They can comment and guide the 
management on various managerial issues, including 
capital sourcing and overcoming financial problems. 
Financially literate directors can enhance the effectiveness 
of the controlling and monitoring roles of the board. 
SMEs managed by owners who lack knowledge and skills 
on accounting or finance may suffer from high agency 
costs (Ang, Cole & Lin 2000). Thus, the board’s literacy 
in accounting and finance enhances the capability of 
managers to handle company activities, particularly those 
relating to financial matters, and consequently improves 
performance.
H1d The financial literacy of the board of directors 
has a positive significant relationship with SME 
performance.
Diversity in the ethnicity of the board is a common 
phenomenon in the multiracial society of Malaysia. 
The business performance of firms is influenced by the 
diversity of race, culture, and language, which reflect 
the multicultural and multiracial society of Malaysia 
(Haniffa & Cooke 2005). Different races, such as Malay, 
Chinese, and Indian, retain their own identities. Cultural 
differences affect the corporate governance of companies 
(Haniffa & Cooke 2005). Directors from diverse ethnic 
backgrounds possess unique cultural values and religious 
beliefs (Salleh, Jenny & Manson 2006). These differences 
affect the board’s effectiveness in performing, controlling, 
and monitoring company activities.
Two main ethnic groups, namely, Malays and 
Chinese, significantly contribute to the socioeconomic 
development of Malaysia (Haniffa & Cooke 2002). Malays 
are the majority race in this country, but the Chinese are the 
main economic contributors (Mamman 2002). Ethnicity 
differences at the top management significantly affect the 
corporate governance practices in Malaysian companies 
(Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy 2009; Salleh et al. 2006; 
Yatim, Kent & Clarkson 2006). The ethnicity of the board 
considerably affects the performance of listed companies 
(Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy 2009). Companies owned 
by Malays, which are known as Bumiputera companies, 
practice internal governance (i.e., quality audit); by 
contrast, those owned by Chinese and other races, which 
are known as non-Bumiputera companies (Yatim et al. 
2006).
Ethnical diversity among board members improved 
the performance of listed companies in Malaysia 
(Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy 2009; Marimuthu 2008). 
Firm performance, which is typically measured by the 
return on assets or return on equity, differs across firms 
with different ethnic backgrounds. In conclusion, the 
ethnicity of the board of directors influences a firm’s 
financial performance, information disclosure, and 
reporting quality (Haniffa & Cooke 2005; Marimuthu 
2008; Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy 2009; Salleh et al. 
2006). These studies obtained mixed results. Several 
studies highlighted the positive effects of ethnical diversity 
(Marimuthu 2008; Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy 2009; 
Haniffa & Cooke 2005), whereas others declared that the 
ethnicity of the board of directors had no significant effects 
on firm performance (Salleh et al. 2006).
Existing evidence is obtained from studies on listed 
companies. Corporate governance is expected to positively 
affect SME performance. Unlike listed companies, SME 
performance is difficult to measure because of lack of 
information (Uhlaner et al. 2007). Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is developed:
H1e The ethnicity of the board of directors is significantly 
related to SME performance.
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF SMES
SMEs typically have concentrated ownership structures 
that are dominated by family members (Stijn Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan & Lang 2002). Concentrated ownership 
structure is a common feature that accounts for 60% of 
the companies in Malaysia (Rachagan & Satkunasingam 
2009). Concentrated ownership exists when a large amount 
of shares (i.e., at least 5% of firm equity ownership) is held 
by an individual investor or large-block shareholders.
A concentrated ownership structure may result 
in agency problems between majority and minority 
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shareholders. An agency problem occurs when the 
minority shareholders are denied of their rights by 
the majority shareholders or by the owner-manager 
(Ding, Zhang & Zhang 2007). Majority shareholders 
or shareholders who are managers are not motivated 
to maximize the wealth of minority shareholders or 
shareholders who are not managers; rather, they intend 
to maximize returns for their benefit. This scenario is 
promoted by weak corporate governance (Rachagan & 
Satkunasingam 2009). An agency problem occurs because 
firm owners who own a majority share of the equity leave 
only a small equity portion for the minority shareholders. 
Owners who are managers have different priorities and 
objectives from owners who are not managers, resulting 
in a unique conflict of interest between majority and 
minority shareholders (Neville 2011; Walsh & Seward 
1990). When managing the company, an owner–manager 
tends to be opportunistic and prioritizes his or her self-
interest, thereby negatively affecting firm performance 
(Demsetz & Villalonga 2001; Miller & Breton-Miller 
2006). Examples of such acts include decisions not to 
provide an appropriate amount of dividend to minority 
shareholders (Chu 2009).
The managerial ownership of concentrated ownership 
companies is significantly related to company performance 
(Arosa, Iturralde & Maseda 2010; Demsetz & Villalonga 
2001; Miller & Breton-Miller 2006; Shleifer & Vishny 
1997; Wellalage & Locke 2011). Managers who have 
high equity ownership may use their positions to deny the 
right of shareholders who do not manage the distribution 
of company profit. This attitude negatively affects firm 
performance. A high level of managerial ownership results 
in ineffective investment decisions, which are indirectly 
detrimental to company performance (Cronqvist & 
Nilsson 2003).
SMEs generally have a concentrated equity ownership 
structure and limited liability. The effect of equity 
ownership structure on the management of listed 
companies differs from that on SMEs (Mueller & Spitz-
Oener 2006). The percentage of ownership by the manager 
in SMEs is usually large (Mueller & Spitz-Oener 2006). 
Such highly concentrated equity ownership of SMEs 
by the management is negatively related to company 
performance. This negative relationship is attributed to the 
increased cost of agency-principal as a result of denying 
minority shareholders of their rights.
H2a Managerial ownership has a significant negative 
relationship with SME performance.
Family ownership is the main form of ownership 
structure of SMEs in Asia (Ibrahim & Samad 2010). This 
case also applies to Malaysia, where family members are 
majority owners. The family ownership structure functions 
as a corporate governance mechanism in SMEs (Claessens 
& Fan 2003). Agency theory posits that a family-owned 
company managed by family members mitigates the 
interest gap between the owner and the manager. No 
agency cost will be incurred in the absence of such a 
gap. However, other scholars argued that agency costs 
can still be incurred in family-owned companies (Ben-
Amar & Andre 2006; Schulze, Lubatkin & Dino 2003). 
In family-owned companies, family members involved 
in firm management will directly or indirectly influence 
the decision making of the firm (Chen & Yu 2011). 
Managers of family-owned firms tend to take actions 
beyond controlling the operation to fulfill the interest of 
their family; by contrast, managers of non-family-owned 
firms always strive to ensure that decisions are made 
for the interest of the stakeholders (Arosa et al. 2010; 
Schulze et al. 2003). Owner-managers of family-owned 
firms tend to sacrify the interest of minority shareholders 
who are non-family members and they tend to favor 
family members for high management-level positions 
or for extraordinary dividends (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; 
Demsetz 1983; Fama & Jensen 1983). The payment of 
extraordinary dividends or compensation incurs additional 
costs and reduces firm income (Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-
Nickel & Gutierrez 2001).
H2b Family ownership has a significant and negative 
relationship with SME performance.
METHOD
In view of the unavailability of audited financial 
statements, this study used a questionnaire survey to 
collect the necessary information from selected SMEs 
(Uhlaner et al. 2007; Hashim 2011; Fiegener 2000; Hamad 
& Karoui 2011).
QUESTIONNAIRE
The questionnaire was divided into three parts. The first 
part contained questions regarding the firm’s background 
and financial information. The second part inquired 
about the demography and characteristics of the board 
of directors. The third part included questions about firm 
ownership structure (see Appendix 1). 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES
Table 1 summarizes the operationalization of variables. 
Firm performance was measured from the return on 
assets, which is calculated by dividing the net income by 
the average total assets. Firm size was measured by the 
number of board members. The ethnicity of the board 
of directors was determined based on the percentage of 
Bumiputera directors on the board. The three dummy 
variables were external directors, CEO duality, and 
financial literacy of board of directors. The measurements 
of the control variables are also included in Table 1.
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RESULTS
SAMPLE
Six hundred and nineteen SMEs in the area of Kuala 
Lumpur and Selangor were initially short listed for the 
study. However, 243 SMEs were discovered to have either 
closed down or move to new locations. The final sample 
consists of 376 SMEs in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor, 
wherein most SMEs are located. Only 83 questionnaires 
were returned, of which 74 questionnaires (i.e., 20%) were 
usable. The data was collected in the year 2014. Table 2 
summarizes the samples.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The descriptive statistics of the variables are summarized 
in Table 3, wherein 56.8% of participating SMEs have 
two-member boards of directors. Most SMEs (86.5%) do 
not have external directors. CEO duality is practiced by 
77% of the SMEs. The practice of CEO duality coupled 
with the low percentage of external directors indicates the 
lack of independence among the top-management group 
members. Board members who are not financially literate 
comprised 62.2%. The lack of independence and financial 
literacy indicates the low level of competency of the board 
of directors of SMEs. Approximately 69% of the SMEs have 
at least 50% Bumiputera board members; 90.5% of the 
SMEs maintain 50% managerial ownership structure; and 
55.4% of SMEs are managed by family members.
TABLE 1. Operationalization of variables
 Variables Measurement
Dependent Variables 
 Firm performance Return on assets = Net income / Average total assets 
  (Arosa et al. 2010; Demsetz & Villalonga 2001)
Independent variables 
 Size of board of directors Number of board members
  (Abor & Biekpe 2007; Hamad & Karoui 2011)
 External board of directors External directors = 1
  No external directors = 0 
  (Bammens & Voordeckers, 008; Brunninge et al. 2007)
 cEO duality CEO duality = 1
  No CEO duality = 0 
  (Abor & Biekpe 2007; Bhagat & Bolton 2008; Hamad & Karoui 2011)
 Financial literacy of board of directors Financial literacy = 1
  No financial literacy = 0
  (Jusoh 2008; Razman & Iskandar 2004)
 Ethnicity of board of directors % of Bumiputera directors on the board
  (Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Salleh et al. 2006)
 Managerial ownership Managerial ownership > 50% = 1
  Managerial ownership < 50% = 0
  (Abor & Biekpe 2007; Mueller & Spitz-Oener 2006)
 Family ownership Family ownership > 50% = 1
  Family ownership < 50% = 0
  (Anderson et al. 2003; Wu et al. 2007)
Control Variables 
 Firm size Total annual sales
  (Arosa et al. 2010; Morck et al. 1988)
 Years of formation No. of years in business since establishment
  (Arosa et al. 2010; Abor & Biekpe 2007)
 Debt ratio Ratio of debt to equity
  (Abor & Biekpe 2007)
TABLE 2. Sample
Description Total %
Total sample 376 100
Completed questionnaires returned  83 22
Questionnaires with incomplete (9) (2)
information
Usable questionnaires 74 20
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DATA TEST
The results of the data test using skewness and kurtosis 
statistics methods show that data normality was not a 
problem in this study (Tabachnick & Fidell 2013). Table 
5 shows that the correlation coefficients among variables 
range from –.321 to .376. Thus, multicollinearity is not an 
issue because the correlation coefficients do not exceed .70 
(Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham 2009). Aside from 
normality test, homoscedasticity must also be checked to 
ensure the absence of heteroscedasticity. Table 4 shows 
TABLE 3. Descriptive statistics
     Variables Measurement of No. of %
 Variables  Companies
  (N = 74) 
Board size 2 board members 42 56.8
 3 board members 21 28.4
 4 board members 3 4.1
 5 board members 8 10.8
Existence of external directors No external directors 64 86.5
Existence of external directors With external directors 10 13.5
CEO duality Non-CEO duality 17 23.0
CEO duality  CEO duality 57 77.0
Financial literacy of board of directors Without financial literacy 46 62.2
Financial literacy of board of directors With financial literacy 28 37.8
Ethnicity of board of directors < 50% Bumiputera board members 23 31.0
Ethnicity of board of directors ≥ 50% Bumiputera board members 51 69.0
Managerial ownership < 50% Managerial ownership 7 9.5
Managerial ownership  ≥ 50% Managerial ownership 67 90.5
Family ownership < 50% Family ownership + non-family managers 33 44.6
Family ownership  ≥ 50% Family ownership + family managers 41 55.4
TABLE 4. White heteroskedasticity
F-statistic 0.559996 Probability 0.84 
Obs*R-squared 6.040774 Probability 0.8118
  Chi-Square
that the Obs*R-squared value is 6.04, which is smaller 
than the critical chi-square value of 18.31 at a significance 
level of 0.05. Thus, the hypothesis of homoscedasticity is 
rejected in favor of heteroscedasticity.
TABLE 5. Correlation between variables
Variables Perform Size External Duality Literacy Ethnicity ManOwn FamOwn CompSize ComAge Debt
           ratio
Perform 1          
Size −.09 1         
External .167 .208 1        
Duality .147 −.109 −.066 1       
Literacy −.088 .307 .018 .029 1      
Ethnicity .177 −.119 −.145 −.149 .056 1     
ManOwn −.321 −.198 −.277 .263 −.129 −.093 1    
FamOwn −.024 .105 .196 .092 .195 −.099 −.104 1   
CompSize −.019 .376 .156 .038 .184 .025 .03 .269 1  
ComAge −.299 .071 .218 −.04 .002 −.201 −.014 .109 .386 1 
Debt ratio −.222 .059 .263 .101 .132 −.048 .014 .059 .135 .106 1
Notes: Perform - Firm performance Ethnicity - Ethnicity of board of directors
 Size - Size of board of directors ManOwn - Managerial ownership
 External -  External board of directors FamOwn - Family ownership
 Duality -  CEO duality CompSize - Firm size
 Literacy -  Financial literacy of board of directors ComAge - Years of formation 
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HYPOTHESIS TESTING
This study used OLS regression for data analysis (Gujarati 
2004). As shown in Table 6, the R2 value is .386, which 
indicates that 38.6% of changes in the dependent variables 
can be explained by the independent variables. The 
adjusted R2 value is 28.9%, which is consistent with 
other studies on SMEs (Abor & Biekpe 2007; Hamad & 
Karoui 2011). 
Table 6 shows that no significant relationship exists 
between board size and SME performance. The result 
suggests that the SME performance does not depend on 
board size. The insignificant results may be due to the 
small SME board size. Table 3 shows that 85.2% of the 
selected SMEs have three or less board members and 56.8% 
have only two board members. 
may be an appropriate approach for SMEs to optimize the 
leadership structure.
Financial literacy of board of directors is expected to 
improve the SME performance. However, Table 6 indicates a 
lack of significant relationship between financial literacy of 
the board and firm performance. Table 3 shows only 37.8% 
of the participating SMEs require their board members to 
have financial literacy. Board members of the remaining 
62.2% do not financial literacy. Results indicate that the top 
management of SMEs has a low level of financial literacy. 
This finding suggests that financial literacy of the top-
management personnel is not a priority among SMEs. The 
lack of financial literacy among SMEs board members may 
be due to the non-mandatory regulatory requirement. Board 
members of SMEs are not required to maintain financial 
literacy of a certain level either as an entry requirement or 
a continuous professional development.
Table 6 shows that the ethnicity of board of directors 
is not significantly related to SME performance at p < .05. 
This finding indicates that H1e is not supported. This finding 
is based on a sample comprising 51 SMEs (69%) with more 
than 50% Bumiputera board members and 23 SMEs (31%) 
with less than 50% Bumiputera board members. Result 
suggest that the SME performance does not differ according 
to the ethnicity of board of directors. 
Table 6 shows that managerial ownership has a 
significant and negative relationship with SME performance 
at p = .003. This result suggests that SME performance 
decreases as the percentage of managerial ownership 
increases. Thus, H2a is supported. As shown in Table 3, 
the total equity of about 90.5% of participating SMEs are 
owned by the management by more than 50%. 
The results are consistent with the agency theory 
which suggests that a high level of managerial ownership 
will have a negative effect on firm performance. A high 
managerial ownership structure is expected to create a 
conflict of interest between majority owners who manage 
the firm and minority owners who do not manage the firm. 
The conflict of interest arises when the majority owners 
act for their self-interests by sacrificing the rights of the 
minority owners. This opportunistic behavior negatively 
affects firm performance.
This study found no significant relationship between 
family ownership and SME performance. Thus, the 
performances of family-owned and non-family-owned 
SMEs do not differ significantly. H2b is rejected. The 
descriptive statistics in Table 3 demonstrate that thirty 
three SMEs (44.6%) in the sample are non-family-owned 
with less than 50% of family ownership and are managed 
by non-family members. Forty-one SMEs (55.4%) are 
family-owned with more than 50% of family ownership 
and are managed by family members.
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This study verified the importance of certain characteristics 
of corporate governance, namely, external directors, CEO 
TABLE 6. Results of OLS regression analysis
Variables Coefficient Std Error Sig
 Size of board of directors −.013 .051 .803
 External directors .307 .136 .028
 CEO duality .267 .107 .016
 Literacy of board members −.103 .093 .275
 Ethnicity of board of .126 .100 .212
 directors
 Managerial ownership −.489 .156 .003
 Family ownership −.068 .089 .452
Control variables   
 Company size .067 .065 .306
 Company age −.016 .000 .008
 Debt ratio −.177 .071 .015
Constant 1.418 .240 .000
R2  .386  
Adjusted R2 .289
Table 6 shows a significant positive relationship 
between external directors and SME performance at p = 
.028. H1b is supported. The result suggests that external 
directors enhance SME performance. Although only 
13.5% of the samples have external directors (see Table 
3), the result clearly supports the notion that a larger 
number of external directors corresponds with a better 
firm performance.
CEO duality has a significant and positive relationship 
with SME performance at p = .016. The result supports 
H1c, which suggests that SMEs with the chairmen also 
act as CEOs would perform better. Table 3 shows that 
CEO duality is practiced by about 77% of the selected 
sample of SMEs. For SMEs, a small top management 
structure requires a strong and transparent leadership. 
In addition, the appointment of separate individuals for 
the CEO and chairman positions would involves higher 
service costs. High service costs among SMEs would 
have a negative effect on the firm value. The practice of 
CEO duality may reduce the cost of conflict of interest 
as the leadership structure is aligned. Thus, CEO duality 
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duality, and managerial ownership. External directors 
are positively related to SME performance because they 
contribute to the effective management of the business 
operation by sharing their knowledge, experience, and 
skills, which in turn enhances the firm’s performance 
(Gabrielsson & Huse 2005; Samuel 2014). External 
directors help owners–managers make independent 
judgments in controlling the firm operation and protecting 
the shareholders from any negative impact that arises 
from the misbehaviors of management. External directors 
promotes the independence and competency of the 
board of directors. Consequently, independent boards 
of directors make good firm decisions and exercise 
independent monitoring of management. The results of 
this study are consistent with the agency theory which 
exerts that independent and competent board decisions 
enhance the firm performance. The results support the 
hypothesis that SMEs must increase the number of external 
directors as board members. 
CEO duality may be acceptable for SMEs although it 
may reduce the firm independence. CEO duality minimizes 
administration and decision-making costs, where cost 
reduction is prioritized for the sustainability and future 
growth of SMEs. This suggestion is consistent with the 
current practice of CEO duality by about majority of SMEs 
(Abor & Biekpe 2007; Voordeckers 2007; Heuvel & Gils 
2006). SMEs with CEO duality would normally perform 
well, even though they may be small and have a low 
external director ratio (Huse 2000). 
Theoretically, results of this study imply that 
managerial ownership does not reduce the conflict of 
interest between the management and shareholders. High 
managerial ownership among SMEs may increase the 
controlling decision power of the managerial owners and 
decrease the governing influence of other shareholders. 
Although the agency theory suggests that managerial 
ownership reduces the conflict of interest between the 
management and shareholders, such relationship cannot 
be established in the context of SMEs due to small board 
size comprising of members are owners. The results are 
consistent with prior SMEs studies which point out that a 
high level of managerial ownership corresponds to low 
firm performance (Cronqvist & Nilsson 2003; Hamad & 
Karoui 2011; Wellalage & Locke 2011). The conflict of 
interest may arise when the majority shareholders who are 
managers do not act for the benefit of the firm but for their 
self-interests resulting in poor firm performance. Thus, 
this study enhances the applicability of agency theory in 
clarifying the concept of conflict of interest within the 
context of SMEs.
Practically, the results of this study support the 
importance of corporate governance to the performance 
of SMEs. Consistent with prior studies on corporate 
governance practices among SMEs in other countries 
such as Ghana (Abor & Biekpe 2007; Samuel 2014), 
Nigeria (Obasan, Shobayo & Amaghionyeodiwe 2016), 
and Tunisia (Hamad & Karoui 2011), findings of this 
study suggest the need to develop and enforce corporate 
governance framework for SMEs in Malaysia. The lack 
of governance monitoring in SMEs contributes to poor 
SME performance. Certain characteristics of the board of 
directors, particularly those related to board independence, 
are significantly associated with firm performance. The 
result suggests that mandatory requirements of good 
governance must be implemented in SMEs to enhance 
their performance, which in turn increases their economic 
contribution. The findings provide bases for considering 
corporate governance as a regulatory code for SMEs 
to contribute to their sustainability, significance, and 
relevance to the Malaysian economy. 
This study has several limitations. The results of 
the survey on SMEs in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor may 
be generalized to SMEs in other areas. The number of 
external directors is based on the number of external 
directors in the board. This measure may be enhanced by 
differentiating independent external directors from non-
independent external directors. The competency of the 
board of directors may be better measured by recognizing 
knowledge and experience as separate components of 
financial literacy.
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APPENDIX 1
COMPANY INFORMATION
Name of the Organization: ____________________________________________
Contact Person’s Name and Telephone Number: _______________________________
Date of completing the questionnaire: ________________________________________
A.  DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Please fill in the blanks or check (√) in the appropriate box. 
1.  Your business was founded in ______________ year
2.  Your startup capital: 
  ≤ RM50,000
  > RM50,000 to ≤ RM100,000
  > RM100,000 to ≤ RM500,000
  > RM500,000 to ≤ RM1,000,000
  > RM1,000,000 (please specify)¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬
3. Industry of your main business:
  Manufacturing (including Agro Based) 
  Manufacturing related services
  Mining and quarrying
  Services (including ICT)
  Primary agriculture
  Other, please specify _________________________
4.  Is your business part of a business group? If the answer is No, please skip Q 5.
 Yes       No
5.  Please choose one of the following: 
  Subsidiary of a family-based business group
  Subsidiary of a business group not controlled by families
  Holding company family based
  Holding company non-family based 
  Other, please specify _________________________
6.  Estimated current capital (2010):
  ≤ RM50,000
  > RM50,000 to ≤ RM100,000
  > RM100,000 to ≤ RM500,000
  > RM500,000 to ≤ RM1,000,000
  > RM1,000,000 (please specify) ¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬
7.  Estimated monthly revenue@ sales (2010):
  ≤ RM10,000
  > RM10,000 ≤ 50,000
  > RM50,000 ≤ RM100,000
  > RM100,000 ≤ RM500,000
  > RM500,000 (please specify) ________________________
8.  Estimated monthly profit (2010): 
  ≤ RM5,000 
  > RM5,000 ≤10,000
  > RM10,000 ≤ RM50,000
  > RM50,000 ≤ RM100,000
  > RM100,000 (please specify) ________________________________
9.  Total assets:   2011  2010  2009  2008  2007
  ≤ RM50,000    
 > RM50,000 to ≤ RM100,000  
 > RM100,000 to ≤ RM500,000  
  > RM500,000 to ≤ RM1,000,000  
  > RM1,000,000 (please specify)  ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ 
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10.  Total liability:   2011  2010  2009  2008  2007
  ≤ RM50,000    
  > RM50,000 to ≤ RM100,000  
  > RM100,000 to ≤ RM500,000  
  > RM500,000 to ≤ RM1,000,000
  > RM1,000,000 (please specify)   ________ ________ ________ ________ ________  
11.  Total employees:  2011  2010  2009  2008  2007
  ≤ 20 employees   
  > 20 ≤ 50 employees
  > 50 to ≤ 100 employees  
  > 100 employees (please specify) ________ _______ ________ ________ ________
B.  GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE (Please fill in the blanks)
12.  Number of members of board of directors (BOD) ___________ members.
13.  Length of service of the present Chairman ___________ years.
  Classification of board members based on following criteria: 
  a. Ethnicity: 
   Bumiputera ___________ members ________ % shares 
   Non-Bumiputera  ___________ members  ________ % shares
  b. Family representation:
   Family board member(s)  ___________ members  ________ % shares
   Non family board member(s)  ___________ members  ________ % shares
  c. Type of directorship:
   Executive director ___________ members  ________% shares
   Outside director ___________ members  ________% shares
* An outside director is defined as a non-executive who is not a family member, a non-family manager or an affiliated 
director such as an attorney or accountant.
  d. Gender:
   Male ___________ members
   Female  ___________ members
  e. Age:
   Less than 30 years ___________ members
   31 – 40 years ___________ members
   41 – 50 years ___________ members
   51 – 60 years ___________ members
   More than 60 years (please specify) ______ ___________ members 
  f. Length of service: 
   0 – 5 years ___________ members
   6 – 10 years ___________ members
   11 – 15 years ___________ members
   16 – 25 years ___________ members
   26 years or more (please specify) _______ __________ members
  g. Directorship other company:
   None company ___________ members
   1 – 2 companies ___________ members
   3 – 4 companies ___________ members
   5 – 6 companies ___________ members  
   7 – 8 companies ___________ members
15. Does the board member have qualification in finance and accounting? 
 Yes       No
16. If yes, please choose any of the following:
 i.  Members of MIA @ other professional bodies’ ___________ members
 ii.  Formal education in accounting & finance ___________ members
 iii.  Experience in the financial sector ___________ members 
  (Please specify average number of year experience  ___________)
17. Does the CEO of your firm also serve as the board Chairman?
 Yes       No
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18. The number of BOD meeting last year: _______ times.
19. How often is the appointment of new director?
 Every one year
 Every two years
 Every three years
 Others, please specify __________
20. Someone from a law/accounting/consulting firm provides professional services to your firm?
 Yes       No
C.  OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CONTROL (Please fill in the blank)
21. The percentage of business ownership of the business based on following criteria:
 a. Ethnicity:
  Bumiputera __________ % shares
  Non Bumiputera __________ % shares
 b. Family representation:
  Family member(s) __________ % shares
  Non family member(s) __________ % shares
 c. Types of investor:
  Owner – manager(s) __________ % shares
  Non owner – managers (Professional managed) __________ % shares
  Government agencies __________ % shares
  Foreigner  __________ % shares
  Other institutional or banks  __________ % shares
  Others, please specify  __________ % shares
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS SURVEY
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